Introduction
In a series of influential studies, James Heckman has argued that the expansion of prekindergarten (pre-K) education for disadvantaged children represents a rare policy that can be justified on both efficiency and equity criteria (Heckman 2006 , Heckman and Masterov 2007 , Heckman et. al 2010 . Pre-K programs are a distinct group of programs designed specifically to make sure that preschoolers are ready for kindergarten and will be succeeding in school by third grade. Every dollar invested in high quality early education yields a 7 to 10% annual return (Heckman 2011) . Few other investments in young people are likely to offer a greater rate of return (Bartik 2011) . Heckman argues that by investing in early education that society can close disparities early rather than paying later to remediate disparities when they are harder and more expensive to close (Heckman 2011).
Based on data from the National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER), it costs about $5500 per year per child to provide pre-K. In 2011, 39 states and the District of Columbia spent about $5.5 billion on prekindergarten initiatives that collectively served approximately 28 percent of the nation's four-year-olds and 4 percent of three-year-olds (Duncan and Magnuson 2013) .
Given the large federal budget deficit and political gridlock in the Congress, it is unlikely that there will be a major national expansion of pre-K. Alan Krueger served for several years as the Chair of President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers. In 2013, he wrote; "There is no obvious pay-for in the case of preschool, however. The Obama administration proposed an increase in the tobacco tax to pay for Preschool for All , and also would require state matching funds in a way that leveraged federal funding. While a higher tobacco tax has many economic benefits, so far there has been little constituency for the tax and an organized opposition against it. I suspect that in the long run, the groups that support preschool education would be more effective if they devoted more effort to building a constituency for a funding source. Until then, they will have good intentions and little prospect at success." (Krueger 2013 ).
In the absence of federal subsidies, the financing of such pre-K investments is primarily a state and local decision. Thus, the preferences of state and local voters play a key role in determining whether the pre-K expansion actually takes place. This paper studies the propensity of California voters to support expanding pre-K. Pre-K is an expensive investment requiring 2 certain upfront expenditures and offering a future risky stream of benefits to the localities and states that adopt the program. When states and localities invest in pre-K, they are making a sunk irreversible investment in people. The payback to these localities will occur years later if these trained individuals remain in the locality and if the treatment is indeed effective in triggering the dynamic complementarities in developing cognitive and non-cognitive skills that scholars such as Heckman have emphasized.
In 1998, 2006, and 2012, California's voters had the opportunity to directly vote on a bundle of taxes and pre-K expansion. Such binding voting is informative about their preferences (Matsusaka 2005) . We use these data to present a revealed preference test for measuring local support for pre-K expansion. Voter initiative data have been used to study the demand for environmental regulation (Deacon and Shapiro 1975 , Kahn and Matsusaka 1997 , Kahn 2002 , Wu and Cutter 2011 , Holian and Kahn 2015 , open space conservation (Kotchen and Powers 2006) , the support for redistribution to the poor (Luttmer 2001) and to document differences in voting patterns by political party (Snyder 1996) .
We test several pre-K support hypotheses related to home ownership, suburbanization, and political ideology. We document that minorities, people who live closer to the city center, poorer people and renters are more likely to support pre-K. Holding these factors constant, Republican voters consistently vote against expanding pre-K. Using the Chetty and Hendren (2015) county level measures of the consequences for a poor child of growing up in a given county, we find that voters in places with worse geographic impacts for poor kids are more likely to support pre-K investment. We use these regression results to predict a demographic index of voter support for pre-K and document that this index is positively correlated with state spending on pre-K based on the state's overall demographics. Together these pieces of evidence support the claim that investment in early education will continue to vary significantly across space because voters differ with respect to their willingness to support this bundle of investment and redistribution to children.
In addition to studying the correlates of pre-K support, we also study the role of demographics and political ideology as correlates of overall expenditure patterns on pre-K programs by state/year. To better understand our ideology results, we present an analysis of the content of editorials supporting pre-K in the New York Times and others that oppose pre-K 3 expansion published in the Wall Street Journal. An open question is whether Republicans would be more likely to support pre-K investment if it was privately supplied through vouchers.
Direct Democracy Voting on Local Pre-K Expansion
Over the last twenty years, several states and localities have relied on direct democracy voting initiatives to determine whether they would enact new laws to invest in expanding pre-K.
Examples include California in 1998 , 2006 and 2012 Indiana. In this section, we focus on the initiatives that we report regressions for in the next section. California often uses direct initiatives to determine the adoption of new laws (Matsusaka 2005) .
In November 1998, Californians voted on Proposition 10. This proposition imposed an additional tax on cigarettes of 50 cents per pack as well as additional taxes on other tobacco products. The revenue from this new tax would be used to create state and county commissions to establish early childhood development and smoking prevention programs. This initiative passed (with 50.5% of the vote) and it provided $700 million per year in pre-K spending in Raises the tax on cigarettes by 80 cents, from the current $1.18 to $1.98, to fund early childhood development. The tax increases for other tobacco products are: 9 cents per ounce on smoking tobacco (for those who roll their own cigarettes), snuff, and chewing tobacco; 2.2 cents per ounce on cavendish, plug, or twist tobacco; 17.8 cents per pack of 20 on small cigars; and 8.8 cents per three on cigars that retail for no more than 5 cents apiece, and 8.8 cents each on more expensive cigars
From an individual voter's perspective, each of the listed pre-K initiatives offers private benefits and private costs. The private cost of voting in favor of such an initiative is that one's taxes will increase. Given California's progressive tax code, richer people will pay a higher share of the taxes. This provides an incentive for such voters to oppose initiatives that they view to be mainly engaged in redistribution. Individual voters will recognize that their private benefits from voting for pre-K expansion will be higher if they have expect that their child will participate in such a new program (Cascio and Schanzenbach 2013) . Richer households and suburban households may already have arranged their childcare and may not find this option to be attractive (Brandon and Hofferth 2003) . A second private benefit from pre-K expansion accrues to home owners in areas whose quality of life is expected to improve in the medium term because of the spatial concentration of young children receiving pre-K education. If enough children are trained and if these children are spatially concentrated then local public goods such as street safety could be improved in the medium term (Deming 2009 (Deming , 2011 . A rational expectations model would predict that this expected discounted capitalization effect would raise home prices in the short run (Hilber and Mayer 2009).
Given that the poor tend to concentrate in center cities (Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport 2008) , this capitalization benefit is likely to be greatest for center city home owners.
Conversely, if pre-K trained children grow up and require fewer resources for welfare, prison and health care then there be a general state wide fiscal spillover independent of where these trained individuals live within the state. In this second case, forward looking home owners would be more likely to support pre-K.
Voting on pre-K may also depend on voter ideology (Snyder 1996) . We use political party of registration data to proxy for voter ideology. We posit that Republicans will be less likely to support public investment in pre-K. This correlation may reflect that this group is less altruistic towards the poor. This group may also live further from such individuals and thus gains less. Republicans may also oppose the expansion of the state and may view public provision of pre-K as a transfer to public sector unions (DiSalvo 2015).
We adopt a reduced form approach and estimate voting regressions of the form presented in equation (1). The unit of analysis will either be at the census tract, census block or census block group. The dependent variable equals (yes votes)/(yes votes + no votes).
In this regression, we will often include county fixed effects and the explanatory variable vector will include a set of relevant correlates of voting patterns. We weight the regressions by the count of total voters on a specific initiative. The error term reflects the unobserved determinants of support for an initiative.
The Role of Political Ideology
In Table One, (1) using only votes from the November 2012 election. In this case our unit of analysis is the census block. The University of California at Berkeley's IGS has taken the precinct level data and used an algorithm to assigned vote counts to census blocks. 13 A precinct consists of several blocks and the algorithm satisfies an adding up constraint. The payoff of smashing precincts into census blocks is that this allows census data to be merged to the voting data. We will return to this point in Table Three As shown in Table Two , relative to Republicans, Democrats support expanding pre-K access, oppose price discrimination for auto insurance and support ending the death penalty. All else equal, a ten percentage point shift in a census block's percent Democrat is associated with a 5.3 percentage point increase in voting for pre-K expansion and a 6.4 percentage point increase in voting in favor of ending the death penalty. We recognize that many voters choose not to vote. In column (4) of Table Two , we report the correlates of participation in voting on Prop 38.
Democrats are less likely to participate in this vote.
The Role of Poor Child Upward Mobility in Support for Pre-K Investment
In Table Three , we report the same regressions reported in Table Two but we now drop the county fixed effects and replace them with four county attributes and cluster the standard errors by county. The four county attributes we include are the log of the county's population in 2010, its latitude and two measures of upward mobility from the Chetty and Hendren (2015) upward mobility geographic index. For 56 of the 58 counties in California, they provide data of the percentage gain (or loss) in income at age 26 from spending one more year of childhood in a given county relative to the national mean. The key point is that they estimate this effect separately for poor children (whose parents earn an income at the 25 th percentile of the national income distribution). In our Table Three we define this variable to be the p25 index. They also estimate this effect for rich children (whose parents earn an income at the 75 th percentile of the national income distribution). We define this variable to be the p75 index.
A priori, it is uncertain whether counties in which poor kids experience a negative treatment effect (i.e a negative p25 index) would support increased investment in early education. While they would benefit from such a cross-subsidized intervention and thus should vote for it out of self interest, it is also possible that one reason for why the county has low upward mobility for the poor is due to low investments in human capital and a voter apathy for such investments. As shown in Table Three , all else equal voters in counties with negative poor kid treatment effects are more likely to vote for pre-K. Interestingly, these counties are also more likely to oppose banning the death penalty.
Socio-Demographic and Spatial Determinants of Pre-K Support
In Table Four , we further study voting on Prop 38 (the pre-K initiative voted on in California in November 2012) but now our unit of analysis is the block group and we have merged in Census data from the year 2010. We must aggregate our block data to the block group data to be able to merge in year 2010 Census data. Table Four presents four regressions with two for Prop 30 (see columns 1 and 2) and two for Prop 38 (see columns 3 and 4). In columns (1) and (3), we include county fixed effects and in columns (2) and (4), we include metro area fixed effects and drop geographic areas more than 75 kilometers from a central business district.
Controlling for a full set of socio-demographic controls, political ideology continues to matter. In Table Four The key difference between columns (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) density have fewer interactions with the urban poor and this may lead them to oppose pre-K investment because they gain little in terms of improvements in their local public goods (street safety) and perhaps because they do not interact with those who will gain from this investment (endogenous altruism). We recognize that these voting regressions are ecological regressions but it is important to note that our unit of analysis is small as it is either block groups or census blocks.
Micro Survey Data
We are able to supplement this actual voting data with individual level survey data. The Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) regularly conducts household surveys before elections. In October 2012, the PPIC asked roughly 2000 California adults about their intended votes in the upcoming election. We use these micro data to estimate equation (2). Table Three ) but the two coefficients are statistically insignificant.
These individual level findings are intuitive. The large negative effect of home ownership suggest that home owners do not believe that the capitalization effects of improved future local public goods will materialize or that the fiscal gains from pre-K treated kids paying greater income taxes, and receiving lower welfare payments will materialize.
Using data from the City of Los Angeles, we have mapped the location of this city's California State Preschool Program locations. 14 By merging in our census block level data, we studied the correlates of who tends to live within one mile of one of these Centers. We find that lower income households and Hispanics (but not blacks) are likely to live within a one mile.
Constructing a Demographic Index of Pre-K Support
Following Luttmer (2001), we take the micro survey PPIC data and use the micro estimates of equation (2) to form a predictive index of each block group's propensity to vote in favor of Prop 38. In particular, we form a demographic index of support for Prop 38.
We construct the explanatory variable ∑ , * presented in equation (3) Intuitively, we use micro data to estimate the coefficients , (see Table Five for such estimates) and then combine these estimates with census block-group data. The vector , is used to collapse the census demographic data into a single index of block-group support for pre-
As shown in Table Six , this single index explains roughly 75% of the variation in actual voting. The results reported in Table Six show that in a regression based on equation (4) while Head Start serves about 920,000 in that age range. 15 We run regressions of the form;
Our data source is the NIEER website. In order to be counted in these data, an education initiative must be "funded, controlled, and directed by the state." Therefore kids who attend private pre-k are not counted in these data.
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As explanatory variables, we have merged in a number of state attributes related to demographics, migration, and political variables. We will discuss each below. In column (1) of In studying NIEER data it is relevant to note that some nuances can arise in determining what is a city pre-K program and what is a state program concentrated on a certain city. A NIEER spokeswoman said that "while the Mayor pushed very hard at first to have the program funded and administered at the city-level, through an income tax increase, in the end, it's a statewide expansion that, right now, just focuses heavily on NYC. The majority of the funds in the new state program for this year did go to NYC, since they were lobbying hardest for it, but over $100 million went to other districts in the state. So, while we talk about NYC as though it is a local program, those children are actually enrolled in the state program". That program would be counted in the NIEER data.
level using each county's population in the year 2000 as the weights. We find all else equal, that states where poor children suffer from living there invest more in pre-K and states where rich children gain from living there invest more in pre-K. As shown in column (3), we find the same effects when we take the ratio of state pre-K to K-12 expenditure.
In the right two columns of We then correlate this index with the year 2002 state level data on investment in pre-K.
The correlation between share of 3 years olds in pre-K and our index is .237. The correlation between share of 4 year olds in pre-K and our index is .260 and the correlation between our index and expenditure per child is .346. These positively and fairly large correlations are consistent with our hypothesis that voter demographics matter in determining public goods investment in pre-K.
Editorial Page Pre-K Discussion in Liberal and Conservative Newspapers
In the previous section, we have used several independent data sets and consistently 
Conclusion
In his discussion at a Brookings Institution Conference, Alan Krueger wrote; " At this stage, I think the most interesting research question is, Why is it taking so long to expand access to preschool education?" (Krueger 2013). We have attempted to answer this question by introducing basic ideas from urban economics. The beneficiaries of the program tend to be concentrated in center cities while the tax payers are disproportionately located in the suburbs.
This spatial separation has implications for both the perceived benefits and costs from introducing this expensive early intervention.
Suburban parents are likely to already have access to quality pre-K and some mothers may choose not to work to invest in their children. Others in the suburbs may view the public provision to be of lower quality than the child care they already can access. Other suburbanites may oppose pre-K because it will raise their taxes and the benefits will be spatially concentrated in improving the lives and the neighborhoods of predominantly center city residents. A political economy literature has examined the preferences for redistribution (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2001 , Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999 , Poterba 1997 , Luttmer 2001 , Alesina and La Ferrara 2005 . This would appear to be an important topic for future research seeking to study the conditions such that pre-K is locally financed.
All else equal, Republicans tend to oppose the public provision of pre-K. During this time of great concern about income inequality, it is important to understand the root causes of Republican opposition to an intervention that is viewed to be cost effective. Does this group reject the social scientific arguments documenting these treatment effects? Or, do Republicans mainly worry about expanding the size of the state and the influence of public sector unions?
One way to test this claim would be to introduce a field experiment in which voters can choose to vote for a private voucher system in which eligible children's parents would receive a voucher for a private pre-K program of their choice. Would Republicans be more willing to vote for such a private voucher approach? Table One California Voting on Pre-K Investment in 1998 and 2006 and 2012 The omitted category is the share Republican.
(1) Table Two California Voting on Initiatives in 2012
The omitted category is the share Republican.
(1) Table Five The Determinants of Individual Stated Support for Prop 38 in 2012
The omitted category is a non-Liberal white woman who is not married, was not born in the United States, rents, does not have children at home and does not have a college degree.
(1) (2) Table Six The Survey Demographic Index Predicts Actual California Voting in 2012
The unit of analysis is a block group. The dependent variable has a mean of .31 and a standard deviation of .09. The explanatory variable has a mean of .586 and a standard deviation of .14. Column (1) does not include county fixed effects. Column (2) reports regression results including county fixed effects.
(1) 
